The Basque Country: the heart of Spain, a part of Spain, or Somewhere Else Altogether by Woodworth, Paddy
Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature 
Volume 33 
Issue 2 Identities on the Verge of a Nervous 
Breakdown: The Case of Spain 
Article 5 
6-1-2009 
The Basque Country: the heart of Spain, a part of Spain, or 
Somewhere Else Altogether 
Paddy Woodworth 
Paddy Woodworth 
Follow this and additional works at: https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl 
 Part of the Modern Literature Commons, and the Spanish Literature Commons 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative 
Works 4.0 License. 
Recommended Citation 
Woodworth, Paddy (2009) "The Basque Country: the heart of Spain, a part of Spain, or Somewhere Else 
Altogether," Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature: Vol. 33: Iss. 2, Article 5. https://doi.org/10.4148/
2334-4415.1702 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by New Prairie Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature by an authorized administrator of New Prairie Press. For more 
information, please contact cads@k-state.edu. 
The Basque Country: the heart of Spain, a part of Spain, or Somewhere Else 
Altogether 
Abstract 
The Basque Country exhibits contradictory symptoms of good health and chronic internal rupture. A 
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Basque nationalist and Spanish nationalist readings of Basque history and culture matter less today than 
the fact that they are held with genuine conviction by big sectors of Basque society. Both traditions have 
their own legitimacy, but neither has been capable of fully acknowledging or including the other. 
Paradoxically, Francoism reinforced Basque nationalist identity, and anxieties about the survival of the 
Basque language stimulated radical Basque nationalism, with enduring consequences. An 
accommodation might be found in acceptance by both sides that Basque identities are multiple, and 
through recognition that there are several ways of being Basque, none of which need negate any of the 
others. The recent Irish settlement offers some pointers, though no rigid templates. Bernardo Atxaga’s 
declaration that Euskera is not the Basque language, but a Basque language, is an indication that this 
process of respecting multiple identities is already underway, though the obstacles to a resolution remain 
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The Basque Country: the heart of Spain, a part of Spain, or 
Somewhere Else Altogether
Paddy Woodworth
“Nafarroa Euskadi da. Lo siento en mi sangre” ‘Navarre is the 
Basque Country. I feel it in my blood’ (A supporter of the izqui-
erda abertzale, author interview)
“Euskadi no es sólo una parte de España, es el corazón de Es-
paña” ‘The Basque Country is not just part of Spain, it is the 
heart of Spain’ (Jaime Mayor Oreja, author interview)
“Euskera is not the Basque language. It is a Basque language. 
We are rich in the Basque Country, we have three languages, 
Euskera, Spanish and French. And now, with globalization and 
rock’n’roll, we have a fourth language, English” (Bernardo Atxa-
ga, author interview)
The long-running crisis of identity in—and about—the Basque 
Country is a more chronic condition than a nervous breakdown. 
The symptoms of hysteria, paranoia, depression, stress, delusion and 
exhaustion are all certainly present in the patient. But we must make 
a more severe diagnosis here. The Basque Country is suffering from 
a crippling internal rupture. And, to adapt a phrase made notorious 
by Xabier Arzalluz, an acerbic leader of the Basque Nationalist Party 
(PNV), this disorder creates ulcers in the Basque and Spanish bod-
ies politic that have bled copiously for many years, and often result 
in fatalities. The psychic wounds produced by the Basque conflict 
are equally dramatic, equally disabling.1
And yet the patient, whether Basque, Spanish, or both at the 
same time, often exhibits the appearance of robust good health. 
The Basque government enjoys powers as broad as any region in 
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Europe, and has made the Comunidad Autónoma Vasca (CAV) 
into an economic and—in many respects—cultural success story. 
Post-Guggenheim Bilbao is a beacon of sophistication to the elite 
international traveler, and can seem not only at ease, but at one 
with itself. Down the coast from Bilbao, the San Antolines fiesta 
in Lekeitio has all the appearance of an exuberant outburst of civic 
pride, community participation, energy and joy. The small Basque 
region is home to half a dozen prestigious and cosmopolitan cul-
tural festivals, from dance in Biarritz to jazz in Vitoria. Then there 
is the quintessentially Spanish-Basque fusion fiesta of Sanfermines 
in Pamplona. As for eating out, you sometimes feel that Michelin 
stars are scattered across the region like confetti at a wedding. On 
the French side of the border, there are Basque ikurriñas the ‘Basque 
national flag’ fluttering gaily alongside French tricolors, and entire 
streets where Basque identity is transmuted into innocent and prof-
itable kitsch in the form of souvenirs.
If the region is suffering from a chronic illness, a casual ob-
server might remark, we should all be as sick as this. Yet the conse-
quences of a chronic crisis of identity shadow every aspect of Basque 
life I have just referenced. An ertzaina  ‘policeman in the service of 
the Basque Autonomous Community’ was shot dead by ETA right 
under Jeff Koons’s Puppy, that durable emblem of the playful post-
modern spirit of the Guggenheim-Bilbao project, on the eve of the 
museum’s inauguration. Talk for even a few moments to many of 
the revelers in Lekeitio’s fiesta, to find out that they are seething 
with anger at their disenfranchisement as Batasuna voters and at 
a judicial offensive which is sweeping many radical activists indis-
criminately into jail. Many of the other revelers, who may not talk 
so freely, live in well-founded fear of Batasuna’s associates in ETA 
and the kale borroka ‘street struggle,’ and feel compelled to hide any 
expression of Spanish identity.2 The gastronomic temple where you 
have just had the best meal of your life may be laundering money for 
terrorists. Those innocent French Basque streets were the setting for 
state terrorist attacks sponsored by Madrid’s PSOE administration 
in the 1980s.3 And so on.
Where, then, to begin the diagnosis of so grim yet so elusive an 
illness, or rather illnesses, because nothing in the Basque Country is 
singular? Perhaps we should start with geography, to find some pur-
2
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chase for our thoughts, some orientation for our ideas. Immediately, 
though, we run into difficulties, because the Basque landscape is 
driven with territorial claims and counter-claims, and any orienta-
tion will be interpreted as an ideological position by one group or 
another. Hesitation comes naturally to any halfway sensitive writer 
on the Basques, because one very soon learns that the simplest sen-
tence about the place and its people will always be construed as par-
tisan by someone. No assumptions here can be politically innocent. 
An anecdote to illustrate this difficulty: a Spanish cultural admin-
istrator I had met in my native Ireland wrote me a charming email 
some years back. He told me he had accepted a position with the 
Foral Government of Navarre, and kindly offered me any assistance 
I might ever require in writing about this ancient kingdom. Shortly 
afterwards, I was commissioned by Signal Books and Oxford Uni-
versity Press to write a book on the Basque Country for their series 
“Landscapes of the Imagination.” In due course, I wrote to my new 
friend, asking for his help with the project, insofar as it related to 
Navarre. Of course, he never replied. From the point of view of the 
government he was now serving, Navarre is simply not part of the 
Basque Country, so he could offer me nothing.
This rigid exclusion of Navarre from the Basque Country, 
however, was not always the position of the Spanish establishment. 
The censors of Franco’s dictatorship, for example, raised no objec-
tion whatsoever when Pío Baroja wrote a guide book to the Basque 
Country in the 1950s which not only included Navarre but made it 
the centre-piece of his account of the region. Baroja had always been 
harshly critical of Basque nationalism. But his physical and spiritual 
home was the valley in which the Bidasoa river unites Navarre, the 
French Basque Country, and the region which is today known as 
the CAV. He had no hesitation in ascribing Basque identity in equal 
measure to all three places. The rift between Navarre and the other 
Basque provinces is a relatively recent one, a response by Spanish 
nationalists (of both the left and right) to the claims of Basque na-
tionalism.
Spanish nationalists and conservatives have no monopoly on 
exclusion. The member of the izquierda abertzale ‘left’ quoted at 
the start of this article refuses to recognize any Spanish identity in 
Navarre. More moderate Basque nationalists all too often exclude 
3
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Baroja himself from the canon of Basque literature, partly because 
he wrote in Castilian, and partly because of his hostility to their 
ideology. Miguel de Unamuno, Blas de Otero, Gabriel Celaya and 
other distinguished writers of Basque origin are also dismissed as 
“Spanish” on similar grounds. It should not be forgotten, of course, 
that Irish nationalists generally offered a similarly cold shoulder to 
James Joyce for many years. It was only after independent Ireland 
gained grown-up self-confidence in the 1960s that Ulysses was un-
banned, and that the cosmopolitan Joyce has become as much—
and more—an icon of the Irish nation as narrow-minded “patriotic” 
writers like Paraic Pearse, the leader of the 1916 Easter Rising which 
sparked the Irish War of Independence. Things change, and then 
they change again.
So, for the purposes of this article, I propose to consider the 
Basque Country as seven provinces, including the CAV, Navarre 
and the three provinces currently under French administration. 
This is not to endorse the Basque nationalist slogan Zazpiak Bat 
‘the Seven are One.’ It may be just as appropriate, or more, to say 
Zazpiak Zazpi ‘the Seven are Seven.’ It is certainly not to pre-judge 
the political status of any part of the region. It is simply to recog-
nize a long and deep cultural association and identity between all 
seven provinces. Conversely, we should also recognize that all the 
provinces have their own individual identities, as well as long and 
deep cultural associations with the adjoining regions, and with the 
nation-states of France and Spain. If that is the geographical terri-
tory we are going to consider, perhaps we should now move straight 
to the political questions which makes the issue of Basque identity 
such a contentious and painful one, at least on the Spanish side of 
the Pyrenees.4 These questions are: to what extent should we recog-
nize as legitimate the fracture which Basque nationalists perceive as 
dividing their country from Spain? A question which must always 
be paired with its twin: to what extent should we recognize as legiti-
mate the common ground which many other Basques perceive as 
uniting their region with the Spanish national project? 
Let us take the Basque nationalist position—or rather positions, 
because nothing is straightforward here—first. Sabino Arana, the 
founding father of Basque nationalist ideology, like many European 
nationalists of the late nineteenth century, based his case for a dis-
4
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tinct national identity partly on racial grounds. His successors in the 
Partido Nationalista Vasco (PNV) ‘Basque Nationalist Party’ have 
shifted the argument to (somewhat) more politically correct ethno-
cultural and historical differentiations. ETA and the izquierda ab-
ertzale have in turn stressed language and even class (the concept of 
the PTV, the Pueblo Trabajador Vasco, the ‘Basque Working People) 
as key signifiers of membership of the Basque polis. 
We could spend a great deal of time and space here decon-
structing Basque nationalist historical, cultural and ideological 
canards. But however historically skewed or ideologically twisted 
some Basque nationalist claims may be, the Basques do have at 
their disposal many, if not all, of the primary materials with which 
peoples construct legitimate national identities, and we will return 
to these materials later. In any case, focusing on the bogus nature 
of some Basque nationalist claims may not assist us very much in 
understanding the Basque Country today. Many studies on nation-
alism suggest that while exposing the fallacious or partial nature 
of nationalist readings of history, and highlighting the flaws in na-
tionalist ideologies, is a necessary and salutary exercise, it misses a 
very important point, indeed the central one. This point was made a 
long time ago by the French historian Ernest Renan: “Amnesia, and 
I would even say historical error, are an essential part of the forma-
tion of a nation” (Hobsbawm 12). Renan himself thought that more 
accurate historical research would undermine nationalist positions. 
But despite the best efforts of many historians, like Eric Hobsbawm 
a century later, this does not appear to have been the case. As Hugh 
Seton-Watson wrote in 1977: “A nation exists when a significant 
number of people in a community consider themselves to form a 
nation, or behave as if they formed one. It is not necessary that the 
whole of a population should so feel, or so behave, and it is not pos-
sible to lay down dogmatically a minimum percentage of a popula-
tion which must be so affected” (5).
The legitimacy of the Basque claim to nationhood, according 
to this view, rests not so much on the veracity of its historical, cul-
tural or ideological underpinnings, but on the degree to which it is 
accepted as a norm by Basque citizens today. The same, of course, 
applies to Spanish claims to nationhood, inside and outside the 
Basque Country. Two valuable recent studies, The Reinvention of 
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Spain by Sebastian Balfour and Alejandro Quiroga, and Imagining 
Spain by Henry Kamen, remind us that Spanish nationalists have 
been no slouches in transforming dubious historical theses into 
political holy writ. Basque nationalism may be just as creative in 
relation to its origins, and just as real in its ideological force, as is 
Spanish nationalism, or any other nationalism. But can we say that a 
“significant number” of contemporary Basques have demonstrated 
a desire for a national identity distinct from that of Spain? The vote 
on the referendum on the 1978 Spanish constitution in the CAV 
suggests that they have.
Basque nationalists campaigned either for abstention or a “No” 
vote on the Constitution, essentially because that document did 
not include a Basque right to self-determination.5 The PNV had 
not been included directly in the parliamentary commission which 
drew up the Constitution. They felt betrayed by the PSOE and the 
Communist Party (PCE), which had both supported Basque self-
determination in the late Franco period but quietly dumped this 
position during the constitutional discussions (Francisco Bustelo 
50). These parties made this shift for two reasons: they knew the 
principle of self-determination was unacceptable to the poderes fác-
ticos ‘de facto powers’—military, financial and ecclesiastical—who 
conditioned the supposedly exemplary constitutional negotiations 
to a very considerable extent; and they knew that many of their own 
supporters were Spanish nationalists and deeply hostile to Basque 
“separatism.” Curiously, many PSOE leaders display total amnesia 
when reminded of this volte face ‘about-face’ today. 
The Basque nationalist campaign against the Constitution was 
remarkably successful. Only 31% of the electorate in the CAV voted 
in favour of the constitution, as against 59% in Spain as a whole–and, 
indeed, as against 61% of the electorate in that other Iberian fiefdom 
of “peripheral nationalism,” Catalonia. And 10% of the Basque elec-
torate voted “No,” double the number across the whole state. It is 
important to add, at once, that of those Basques who did vote, 75% 
voted in favor of the new arrangements (against 88% in Spain over-
all). The Basque “No” vote represented 25% of participants, three 
times the Spanish (and Catalan) average. Predictably, these figures 
are read by Basque and Spanish nationalists in diametrically op-
posed ways. For Basque nationalists, the Basque people—the whole 
6
Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 5
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol33/iss2/5
DOI: 10.4148/2334-4415.1702
Woodworth                           281
electorate—has never given its majority assent to the Constitution. 
For Spanish nationalists, a ringingly clear majority—three quar-
ters—of Basque voters approved the foundational text of modern 
democratic Spain. They argue that abstention figures are notorious-
ly open to any interpretation one cares to give them. Furthermore, 
Spanish nationalists add, a majority of the Basque electorate (53%) 
did support the Basque Statute of Autonomy in a referendum only 
two years later. And that statute is firmly set within the limits of the 
1978 constitution, and had the support of the PNV. The statute was 
even endorsed by the political-military wing of ETA, whose political 
surrogates in Euskadiko Ezkerra called for a “Yes” vote in the sec-
ond referendum, having advocated a “No” vote in 1978.6 This broad 
vote for the statute shows, Spanish nationalists say, that the Basque 
people supported the Constitution retrospectively, at the very least. 
The Basque nationalists have their counter-arguments. They 
point out that subsequent elections have constantly yielded an over-
all majority to parties which proposed either abstention or rejection 
of the Constitution. This tends to support their interpretation of the 
very high level of abstention in 1978. As for accepting the Statute 
of Autonomy, most Basque nationalists contend that they agreed 
its terms as a pragmatic holding operation, not as a principled ex-
pression of their core position on Basque identity. It would have 
been suicide for the PNV not to seize the opportunities offered by 
the very significant powers Madrid was conceding to Vitoria (the 
Basque administrative capital), but such acceptance should never 
have been taken to imply a final settlement. In recent years the PNV 
has repeatedly insisted that these powers, though they are extensive, 
are not commensurate with Basque status (in their eyes) as a sover-
eign nation. With 20 years elapsed, they say, and in a Spain where 
democracy has been consolidated and the poderes fácticos firmly 
subjected (one hopes) to the rule of law, it is not unreasonable to 
renegotiate a constitution that was reached under the duress of mili-
tary tutelage, and to which a majority of Basques never subscribed 
in the first place. 
I have focused here on the arguments around the constitutional 
referendum outcome not because I think they clinch the issue of 
Basque nationhood either way, but because they reveal a significant 
fissure between many Basques and the constitution’s model of con-
7
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vivencia or ‘co-existence.’ Madrid ignored, and ignores, this fissure 
at its peril (Basque nationalists unfortunately also tend to ignore the 
fact that this fissure divides Basque from Basque on their home ter-
ritory as deeply as it divides Basque nationalists and Spanish nation-
alists in the context of the whole state). To paper over this fissure, or 
to argue that it should not exist, will not stop Basque people falling 
into it as the conflict in the region grinds on relentlessly, decade 
after decade. 
You may say, with some justice, that the last time the fissure was 
last mapped in electoral detail was 30 years ago, and that it is prob-
ably less wide and deep today. That is a rational speculation, which 
opinion polls tend to support.7 Ironically, however, a real opportu-
nity to test support for Basque sovereignty today, at a deeper level 
than poll samples, was lost when the Spanish parliament, govern-
ment and judiciary rejected the proposal of the Lehendakari ‘Basque 
first minister,’ Juan José Ibarretxe, to hold a consulta on this issue in 
2008.8 In any case, Ibarretxe’s dogged, not to say obstinate, persis-
tence in pursuing this ‘consultation’ indicates that the fracture still 
conditions political and cultural life in the region. It might be useful 
at this point to ascertain what forces have kept this wound open 
while a boldly restructured Basque economy has boomed, Bilbao 
has famously reinvented itself, and cultural production in Euskera 
has blossomed, so that a casual visitor to the region is likely to carry 
away the impression of vibrant prosperity indicated in the opening 
paragraphs of this article. To comprehend these forces, we must first 
understand something about the factors which make the Basques a 
distinctive people. The main factor, which has given many Basques 
a sense of separate national identity is their language, Euskera. True, 
people do not need their own language to form a nation—just think 
of the Swiss, or the Americans—and nor do the speakers of mi-
nority languages always seek national status. But Euskera’s unique 
linguistic status, its lack of any clear structural relationship to any 
other language in the world, and certainly none to its immediate 
neighbours, gives it a powerful cachet as the main badge of Basque 
identity. 
And while Basque nationalists have certainly “got their history 
wrong” on many occasions, the history of the region does have fea-
tures that distinguish it from its neighbours. The Basque were much 
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less exposed than their southern neighbours to the great Roman, 
Muslim, Jewish and Visigothic cultures that dominated or influ-
enced most parts of the peninsula—though there was a lot more 
interpenetration with these cultures than Basque nationalist histo-
riography likes to admit. Nor did this relative isolation forge any 
sense of a unified political identity in the early Middle Ages. Almost 
always divided among themselves on lines broadly corresponding to 
the current provinces, Basque lords formed shifting alliances with 
their peers, and just as easily with elements of the emerging Span-
ish and French kingdoms to the south and north. They became ab-
sorbed, sometimes peacefully and sometimes by military conquest, 
into these kingdoms by the late Middle Ages. Even where one can 
attribute the absorption of a Basque province to conquest, one can 
always find Basques who were willingly fighting on the side of the 
conquering monarch. The Basques’ internal feuding, known as “the 
wars of the bands,” remained notorious even after formal absorp-
tion. Ironically, the remarkable grant by Castile of a fuero ‘special 
right’ of “universal nobility” to the peoples of Guipúzcoa and Viz-
caya was probably motivated more by a desire to undermine the 
authority of the fractious local aristocracy than by any recognition 
of special qualities in the Basques, though of course Basque nation-
alists like to read it that way.9
Whatever the intentions of Castile, however, the relationship of 
the Spanish Basques to this and other fueros differs from the typi-
cal experience with such special local privileges in the rest of the 
emerging Spanish nation. There is little doubt that the economic 
privileges extended to the Basque provinces were exceptional, and 
none at all that these privileges lasted much longer into the con-
temporary period than elsewhere. Among other things, the customs 
frontier with Spain remained on the river Ebro, rather than on the 
French border, until the middle of the nineteenth century. So while 
other regions of Iberia also enjoyed special rights, it is certainly 
arguable that the Spanish Basques had more extensive fueros, and 
held on to them longer than anybody else. The loss of these rights 
after the nineteenth-century Carlist Wars, coupled with the hectic 
late-nineteenth-century industrialisation of Basque cities, especially 
Bilbao, and even of the countryside, created a sense of estrangement 
and resentment against Spain in many Basques. As usual, it is dan-
9
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gerous to oversimplify: in the same period other Basques, especially 
the financial-industrial oligarchy, were drawn towards closer iden-
tification with Madrid. The influx of Spanish-speaking workers to 
fill the new factories, many of them in small towns, certainly created 
new social tensions, which generated nationalist sentiment. A lot 
of these workers brought with them Marxist and anarchist ideolo-
gies, regarded as anathema by many in this conservative Catholic 
region.
It is one of the ironies of modern Basque history that ETA, ex-
pressing the most radical form of Basque nationalism today, should 
have attempted to fuse it with Marxism-Leninism. This was not how 
Arana had envisaged his movement ending up. Arana invented a 
flag, a separatist ideology, and even a new name, Euzkadi (now Eu-
skadi), for the Basque homeland. He preached total independence 
from Spain, first for Vizcaya, and then for all seven provinces. How-
ever, during an illness in prison, shortly before his death, he shifted 
his ground and argued for Basque autonomy within a Spanish state. 
The PNV continues to this day to oscillate between aspiring to inde-
pendence, or at least “sovereignty,” and settling for autonomy, a dy-
namic aptly described by Santiago de Pablo, Ludger Mees and José 
Antonio Rodríguez Ranz as “the patriotic pendulum.” The ambigu-
ity of the party’s rhetoric as the pendulum swings has been useful 
at certain elections and moments of internal crisis. But it infuriates 
and baffles its critics, both in the izquierda abertzale and in Span-
ish nationalist parties. The Statute of Autonomy stimulated autono-
mist thinking in the PNV during the 1980s and much of the 1990s, 
but pro-sovereignty voices have dominated again since the PNV’s 
Lizarra-Garazi pact with the izquierda abertzale in 1998.10 This am-
biguity understandably frustrates the PNV’s opponents, who often 
compare it unfavourably with the clear-cut pro-independence pro-
gram of the Scottish Nationalist Party. 
The forms Francoism took in the Basque Country played, iron-
ically enough, a significant role in forging contemporary Basque 
identities which the dictator would have found repugnant. By treat-
ing Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa as occupied “traitor provinces,” and 
subjecting Basque culture to harsh repression, the Caudillo gave 
bitter substance to some of Arana’s claims. It was in this suffocat-
ing atmosphere of occupation that ETA was born in 1959 as a clan-
10
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destine student study group, dedicated to the Basque language and 
to symbolic acts of defiance like putting Basque flags on mountain 
tops. But its members grew impatient with the passivity of the PNV, 
representing a defeated generation, and shifted towards armed re-
sistance to the dictatorship. 
Why did the Basques, and only the Basques, develop a signifi-
cant armed opposition to Franco, demanding their own state? And 
why does this armed movement remain a powerful, if diminished, 
destabilising factor in Spain today? Repression was bloodier in 
Badajoz than it was in Bilbao, but you do not find the Extremeños 
looking for independence because of what Franco did to them. The 
difference is, surely, that the repression had a national dimension 
in the Basque Country that it did not have in the Leftist heartlands 
of Spain. It involved the repression of a much-loved language, and 
the imposition of a set of symbols with which most Basques could 
not identify. But, one may well ask, was not that also the situation 
in Catalonia? And yet the Catalans never gave much support to the 
short-lived group, Terra Lliure ‘free homeland’, which claimed to 
represent them in arms against the state. Here we enter very dif-
ficult terrain. It has been well mapped, however, by the anthropolo-
gist Joseba Zulaika. He argues that there are elements inherent in 
Basque culture which make many Basques identify negotiation and 
compromise, essential elements in a democracy, with betrayal. Zu-
laika traces this resistance to compromise through many aspects 
of Basque culture, from hunting through card-playing to the oral 
poetry of the bertsolaris.11 He also stresses the religious formation 
of many ETA members of the period, and of the metamorphosis 
of religious vocation into existentialist and Marxist ideologies of 
commitment and action. For an insider’s version of the world which 
gave birth to ETA, there are few, if any, richer sources.
Using a more conventional set of sociological tools, the Italian 
writer Daniele Conversi explicitly contrasts the “alternative routes 
to nationalist mobilisation” taken by the Basques and Catalans. His 
most fertile idea is that it was the “weakness,” not the strength, of 
Basque culture and identity that led to the emergence of a violent 
nationalist movement. The Catalan language had a literary tradi-
tion comparable with the richest in Europe, and was still a means 
of daily communication for millions in the 1950s. This was a source 
11
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of great national self-confidence for the Catalans. This vibrant cul-
tural world gave them a stage on which to experience and play out 
their sense of national identity even under the dictatorship. The 
simple fact that Catalan is also relatively easy to learn by osmosis, 
because of its similarities to Castilian, meant that immigrants were 
much more easily assimilated into this Catalan universe. In short, 
the Catalan nationalists under the dictatorship experienced their 
culture as oppressed, but by no means thought of it as threatened 
with extinction.
In contrast, the Basque literary tradition, at least in terms of the 
written word, is decidedly thin until the last century. However, the 
all-too-common impression that Euskera has no literary tradition, 
that it has never been more than a “primitive” and “rural” language 
with a purely oral culture, and that it is kept on life support today 
by subsidies from the autonomous government, is false.12 Bernart 
Dechepare’s Linguae Vasconum Primitiae, ‘The first book published 
in Euskera’ in fact came respectably early by comparison with other 
vernacular printed literatures, in 1545. But Dechepere’s collection 
of religious, secular and erotic poetry contains a verse in Kontra-
pas which, while appropriate enough for such a novel venture at the 









get out into the street!
Many people thought
writing in Basque was impossible.
Now they recognise
They were deceiving themselves.  (116)
Most of the sparse crop of books which followed were transla-
tions of religious works, including a fine Calvinist New Testament. 
12
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The masterpiece of early Basque literature, Gero ‘Later’ (published 
in 1643), is a work of lively originality, though it has a religious 
theme, the vice of procrastination. Atxaga describes its author, Pe-
dro Axular, as the Basque Cervantes.13 Atxaga acts as a (somewhat 
reluctant) international spokesperson for Basque literature because 
his works have been more widely translated than any other Basque 
author.14 He recognises that the Basque canon has been very un-
even, indeed that it has almost disappeared at times, and that the 
literary language had to be virtually reinvented by the poet Gabriel 
Aresti in the Franco period. But Atxaga argues that this may not 
be a critical deprivation for contemporary writers in Euskera be-
cause “el lenguaje literario es único, que sólo hay uno y es universal” 
‘there is only one literary language, and that language is universal’ 
(Henry Bengoa 73). That is, writers are free to mine classics from 
many other cultures, something he has done triumphantly himself 
in his best-known work to date, Obabakoak ‘People of [the village 
of] Obaba.’ This loosely linked series of stories are unmistakeably 
Basque in their setting, but are almost all adaptations of stories from 
the European and Middle Eastern traditions.
There is a strong element of making a virtue out of a necessity 
in this argument, however. While all writers can draw on literature 
in languages foreign to them, the best case for writing in their own 
language is surely that they can say things in it that can be fully ex-
pressed in no other way. So a limited tradition in one’s own tongue 
has to be an impoverishment. Atxaga, who is not afraid of contra-
dicting himself, comes very close to saying this elsewhere: “Creo 
que la relación con el euskara … es lo más característico de nuestro 
comportamiento y de nuestro modo de vivir, algo que no podemos 
perder sin perdernos, al menos un poco, a nosotros mismos” ‘I be-
lieve that the relationship with Euskera … is the most characteristic 
thing about our behaviour and our way of life, something which we 
cannot lose without losing, at least a little, our own selves’ (Henry 
Bengoa 57). And Euskera, as we have seen, cannot be learned by 
osmosis, but only by a long period of study and immersion, far be-
yond the cultural and financial means of most immigrants. As a 
result, Basque nationalists had long felt that their culture was not 
just under siege but in danger of complete disappearance. Dur-
ing the Franco period, there was a widespread sense of despair, 
13
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a sentimento agónico, of living on the threshold of extinction as a 
people. As Conversi puts it, the first generations of ETA believed 
that “only drastic measures such as mass insurrection could save 
them from their doom,” and this feeling found a broad echo in the 
Basque population. Conversi concludes that the Basque experience 
is one where “violent conflicts have been revived by weak identities, 
and weak identities have been rejuvenated through violent conflict” 
(268). Atxaga echoes this anxiety many Basques feel about losing 
their language, and therefore their identity. He is keenly aware that, 
as he puts it, “la falta de reconocimiento mata” ‘lack of recognition 
kills’ (Henry Bengoa 58), that without a community of writers and 
readers in Euskera, some kind of extinction would indeed occur.
Today, such an extinction seems less likely than at any time in 
the last 150 years. A quarter of the people in the CAV now speak 
Euskera as their first language, compared to fifteen percent when 
Franco died.15 From the outside, because of his success in trans-
lation, it sometimes seems as if Atxaga is the only contemporary 
Basque producing a significant literary output; but several other 
distinctive writers, like Ramón Saizarbitoria, Joseba Sarrionandia 
and Arantxa Urretavizcaya are widely considered to be first-class. 
Widely, that is among the very small public which actually reads 
their books in Euskera, and the rather larger ones, inside and out-
side the Basque Country, which read them in Spanish. Nevertheless, 
Euskera is still clearly vulnerable on both the vernacular and cul-
tural fronts, though the threats today are more likely to come from 
the globalisation of culture, coupled with the indifference of many 
Basques, than from any ill intent from Spanish nationalism. 
Atxaga has rejected ETA’s ideology since the transition to de-
mocracy, and is increasingly inclined to blame apathy and inertia 
at home rather than any exterior agency for the fact that Euskera 
as a literary and spoken language is still relatively weak. Nor does 
he share any radical vision of a monocultural Basque Country. 
His position is unusually pluralistic, in that he wants to celebrate 
all Basque identities, despite coming from an Euskaldun (Basque-
speaking) milieu. “Euskera [he told me] is not the Basque language. 
It is a Basque language. We are rich in the Basque Country, we have 
three languages, Euskera, Spanish and French. And now, with glo-
balisation, the movies and rock’n’roll, we have a fourth language, 
14
Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 5
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol33/iss2/5
DOI: 10.4148/2334-4415.1702
Woodworth                           289
English.”16
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Atxaga was a member of Pott 
(‘failure’ in Euskera), a literary group which produced an epony-
mous and very influential magazine. Mari José Olaziregi describes 
these writers thus in Waking the Hedgehog: “the group manifested 
their literary preferences clearly by concentrating on literatures from 
central Europe (Kafka, Werfell, Celan, and so on) and the English-
speaking world (detective novels, film noir, adventure novels), as 
Borges had recommended in his essays. But, above all, the members 
of Pott defended the autonomous nature of literature” (21). This 
meant rescuing Basque culture from the narrow vision of Basque 
nationalism, though not all the members of the group have been as 
consistent as Atxaga in escaping dogmatic political categories. Sar-
rionandia was imprisoned on charges of ETA membership in 1980, 
and made a dramatic escape five years later, concealed in an ampli-
fier used by a band visiting his jail. The sophisticated fiction he has 
continued to produce while underground is praised by many who 
find his politics repellent. In sharp contrast to Sarrionandia’s trajec-
tory, fellow Pott alumnus Jon Juaristi (who had been a member of 
ETA in the early 1970s), went so far in rejecting his old loyalties that 
he became an articulate and passionate advocate for the Spanish na-
tionalism of the Partido Popular in the Aznar period.17
The very diversity of paths chosen by these members of Pott 
illustrates the often neglected fact that Basque identity is not nar-
rowly particular but remarkably heterogeneous. Ordinary families 
can display the same uncomfortable plurality in politics: you may 
find that a father is in the PP, a daughter in Batasuna, and a cousin 
is a councillor for the PSOE. Bilbao, as its wiser citizens will of-
ten remind you with pride, not only gave birth to Arana, father of 
Basque nationalism, but to Dolores Ibárruri, la pasionaria, icon of 
the international communist movement, and to several of the semi-
nal figures in the foundation of the Spanish Socialist Party. And do 
not forget, they will add, that in the mansions of the Bilbao suburb 
of Neguri one could always finds some of the staunchest defenders 
of conservative Spanish nationalism.
Socialists and conservatives whose primary identity is Spanish 
collectively represent close to half of the Basque electorate. They 
do not live in ghettos and in many respects live very similar lives 
15
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to Basque nationalists, celebrating the same fiestas and support-
ing the same football teams. In particular, those conservatives who 
come from a Carlist background share many traditions with their 
Basque nationalist neighbours, from pelota to Catholicism to use of 
the Basque language.18 Their reading of the region’s history is drawn 
from many of the same materials as those which furnish Basque 
nationalism’s narratives, but they construct a completely different 
national edifice. As Marianne Heiberg pointed out long ago in an 
excellent but often overlooked book on the region, The Making of 
the Basque Nation, each narrative is “partially valid” in its own way 
(ix). In the year 2000 I asked Oreja, a senior member of the PP at 
Spanish and Basque level, whether a “Downing Street Declaration” 
from Madrid would break the logjam in the region (World 25).19 
He answered with a resounding “No” on two counts. The first was 
based on frank self-interest. It is an open secret, he said, that Spain 
“does” have self strategic and economic interests in the Basque 
Country, and very big ones at that. The second, quoted at the outset 
of this article, was based on his Spanish nationalist reading of his-
tory, which puts the region not on the periphery, but at “the heart 
of Spain.” Oreja declared, with patent sincerity, that the Basques had 
been the initiators of the reconquista and had thus been part of the 
lifeblood of the Spanish nationalist project from its inception. One 
can challenge the details of his historical account, just as one can 
question Basque nationalist orthodoxy, but, forgive me for repeat-
ing, this is to miss the point. The point is that many Basques, and 
many Spaniards outside the Basque Country, choose to believe that 
the region is an integral part of what makes Spain Spanish.20 As long 
as they do—and it is likely to be for a very long time—their stories 
are also part of the meta-narrative of the Basques.
Recent research suggests that more Basques identify themselves 
as being both Basque and Spanish than as subscribing solely to one 
or other of these identities (Balfour and Quiroga 4). One of the few 
beauties of the Belfast Agreement which ended the Irish conflict 
was the recognition, by both sides, of the legitimacy of the identity 
of their opponents.21 Unionists recognize the right of Irish national-
ists and republicans to Irish symbols and traditions, and Republi-
cans and nationalists recognize the right of unionists to celebrate 
the British monarchy and the Union flag on Irish soil. All Basque 
16
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factions have, so far, taken from the Irish experience only what is 
advantageous to their own cause in the short term. The concept of 
respect for multiple identities could well be to the advantage of all 
of them. In any case, as outsiders, we cannot understand the Basque 
Country through the mutually exclusive prisms of Basque and 
Spanish nationalism. We can only see the whole rich, vibrant and 
tragic picture through the binocular visions, often contradictory, 
of writers like Atxaga, Baroja and Unamuno, and indeed of film-
makers like Julio Medem. The Basque poet Gabriel Aresti, whose 
reclamation of Basque identity and the Basque language in the dark 
days of the dictatorship inspired so many young Basques, concludes 
his best-known poem, Nire Aitaren Etxea ‘The House of My Father,’ 
with these lines:
Ni hilen naiz,
nire arima galduko da,
nire askazia galduko da,




My soul will be lost,
My descendants will be lost,
But the house of my father
Will remain
Standing.  (260-61)
Whatever form the Basque house takes in the future, it must 
surely be strong enough, and broad enough, to accommodate all the 
identities of all its children.22
Notes
1 The phrase “Basque conflict” is itself a controversial one. Apologists for ETA 
often use it to imply that acts of violence in the Basque Country are the inevi-
table consequence of the conflict, rather than the responsibility of those who 
carry them out. Yet those who argue that no political conflict exists—that is, 
17
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that the problem is one of criminality, pure and simple, by the terrorists—are 
blanking out the context in which these acts take place.
2 Batasuna is a pro-independence party close to the thinking of ETA, banned 
since 2002 under Spain’s Ley de Partidos ‘Parties’ Law,’ because it refuses to 
condemn ETA attacks. The judicial offensive is based on a blurring of the line 
between radical activism and terrorism. But this line is often blurred in reality: 
the kale borroka ‘street struggle’ is a form of low-intensity terrorism or political 
vandalism and bullying by teenage radicals close to ETA.
3 A minister and deputy minister from Felipe González’s center-left PSOE 
government has been found guilty of organizing a kidnapping associated with 
the Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación (GAL), which killed 26 people in the 
French Basque Country between 1983 and 1986 (Woodworth, Dirty War 426).
4 Basque nationalism is weakest (but probably growing) in the French Basque 
Country (Iparralde in Euskera), with about ten percent of the vote going to ab-
ertzale parties. I do not discuss it here in any detail because it is inappropriate 
to the frame of this edition of the journal, which directs us towards “the case 
of Spain.” But it is important to remember that, for Basque nationalists of all 
stripes, Iparralde is an integral part of their region. For a discussion of related 
issues, see Woodworth’s The Basque Country (245-69).
5 Article 2 of the 1978 Constitution references, in the same sentence, the “in-
dissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation” and guarantees “the right to autonomy 
of the nationalities and regions that are integral to it.” This “feat of semantic 
engineering” (Balfour and Quiroga 46) does not even specify which parts of 
Spain are regions, and which nationalities, nor does it clarify the relationship 
between “nation” and “nationality.” For an excellent discussion see Balfour and 
Quiroga (45-54).
6 ETA-Militar, the only ETA operating since the early 1980s, and the izquierda 
abertzale have never supported the Statute of Autonomy.
7 A survey cited by Balfour and Quiroga indicated that 25% of Basques felt 
solely Basque, and a further 19% more Basque than Spanish, with 34% equally 
Basque and Spanish and 8% more Spanish than Basque or only Spanish (Cen-
tro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, Boletín 31, 2003: 3-4). Most surveys sug-
gest that little more than 50% of Basques consider themselves Basque national-
ists, and by no means all of these would fall into the “solely Basque” category 
and support full Basque independence.
8 The tendency of much of the Spanish judiciary to act as a chorus for the gov-
ernment of the day, rather than as an independent and separate power of the 
state, is of considerable assistance to Basque nationalist propagandists when 
they seek to discredit Spanish democracy. The same goes, only more so, for the 
18
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judicial offensive against Basque radicals, which has attracted sober criticism 
from human rights bodies. 
9 The granting of aristocratic status to an entire population had the paradoxical 
outcome of creating an egalitarian democracy, at least in theory, as Juan Aran-
zadi has pointed out (51). 
10 This pact, explicitly modeled on selective aspects of the Irish peace process, 
formed a Basque “pan-nationalist front” ranging from ETA to the PNV, in sup-
port of Basque national sovereignty. It foundered when ETA ended the cease-
fire on which it had been based, alleging that the PNV had not taken agreed 
steps to set up sovereign Basque institutions across the seven provinces.
11 Bertsolaris are spontaneous versifiers, capable of composing long pieces in 
public, alternating verses with a competitor following a common theme and 
rhyme scheme.
12 There is, indeed, a very lively culture of oral poetry in Euskera to this day. 
At most Basque fiestas, and at many informal social gatherings, two or more 
bertsolariak ‘versifiers’ will compose and exchange stanzas spontaneously over 
long periods, following a set subject and rhyme scheme.
13 The pen-name of Pedro Daquerre Azpilicueta, parish priest of the French-
Basque village of Sara.
14 The London Observer included him in its 1999 list of the “21 top writers for 
the 21st century.” 
15 The contemporary figures for the French Basque Country and Navarre 
are 22% and 11% respectively. See <http://www.eustat.es/elem/ele0004600/
tbl0004653_i.html>.
16 The quotation is from an interview with the author in Reno, February 
2008.
17 Juaristi’s ideological inversion is not unusual among former leftist mem-
bers of ETA. Many individuals, it seems, can only abandon one dogmatism by 
clutching on to another. And while Juaristi has abandoned the identity of his 
own tribe, and written beautifully about the personal cost this departure exacts 
in El Bucle Melancólico ‘The Melancholy Loop’ (268), he has gone further than 
most of his former comrades in embracing an entirely new identity, that of 
Judaism and the defence of Zionism, a move which must have tested the latent 
anti-Semitism of some of his new bedfellows in Madrid.
18 Antonio Basagoiti, a leader of the Basque PP, makes a case for the Basque 
identity of PP voters in the region (Woodworth, Basque Country 110-11).
19 The Downing Street Declaration (1993) was a joint Irish-British statement 
in which Britain confirmed that it had “no selfish strategic or economic interest 
19
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in Northern Ireland.” It was a key moment in the Irish peace process, convinc-
ing the IRA and Sinn Féin that Britain would not stand in the way of a united 
Ireland if a majority in Northern Ireland voted to leave the UK.
20 A comparison with Northern Ireland is instructive here. It is a long time 
since any British conservative has believed Northern Ireland was remotely 
close to the heart of the United Kingdom.
21 For a discussion of the relationship between the Irish and Basque peace pro-
cesses, see Woodworth’s “The Spanish-Basque Peace Process.”
22 New waves of immigration are changing these identities all the time. It is fas-
cinating to watch young Asian children, adopted by Basque parents, participat-
ing in Basque fiestas. Or sub-Saharan Africans working on fishing boats where 
the dominant language is Euskera. Who knows what they may contribute to the 
increasingly always rich and complex identity of the land of the Basques?
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